Measurement-device-independent quantum digital signatures by Puthoor, Ittoop Vergheese et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measurement-device-independent quantum digital signatures
Citation for published version:
Puthoor, IV, Amiri, R, Wallden, P, Curty, M & Andersson, E 2016, 'Measurement-device-independent
quantum digital signatures' Physical Review A, vol. 94, 022328, pp. 1-11. DOI:
10.1103/PhysRevA.94.022328
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1103/PhysRevA.94.022328
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Physical Review A
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
PHYSICAL REVIEW A 94, 022328 (2016)
Measurement-device-independent quantum digital signatures
Ittoop Vergheese Puthoor,1,* Ryan Amiri,1 Petros Wallden,2 Marcos Curty,3 and Erika Andersson1
1SUPA, Institute of Photonics and Quantum Sciences, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh EH14 4AS, United Kingdom
2LFCS, School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, 10 Crichton Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AB, United Kingdom
3EI Telecomunicacio´n, Department of Signal Theory and Communications, University of Vigo, Vigo E-36310, Spain
(Received 14 May 2016; published 23 August 2016)
Digital signatures play an important role in software distribution, modern communication, and financial
transactions, where it is important to detect forgery and tampering. Signatures are a cryptographic technique for
validating the authenticity and integrity of messages, software, or digital documents. The security of currently used
classical schemes relies on computational assumptions. Quantum digital signatures (QDS), on the other hand,
provide information-theoretic security based on the laws of quantum physics. Recent work on QDS Amiri et al.,
Phys. Rev. A 93, 032325 (2016); Yin, Fu, and Zeng-Bing, Phys. Rev. A 93, 032316 (2016) shows that such
schemes do not require trusted quantum channels and are unconditionally secure against general coherent
attacks. However, in practical QDS, just as in quantum key distribution (QKD), the detectors can be subjected to
side-channel attacks, which can make the actual implementations insecure. Motivated by the idea of measurement-
device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), we present a measurement-device-independent QDS
(MDI-QDS) scheme, which is secure against all detector side-channel attacks. Based on the rapid development of
practical MDI-QKD, our MDI-QDS protocol could also be experimentally implemented, since it requires a similar
experimental setup.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.94.022328
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures are techniques for guaranteeing the
authenticity and integrity of a message. They play a sig-
nificant role for example in financial transactions, software
distribution, and e-mail. Signature schemes allow a sender to
exchange messages with many recipients, with the assurance
that the messages cannot be forged or tampered with. In
addition, signed messages are also transferable, and cannot
be repudiated. Transferability means that a message, which
is accepted by an honest recipient, will also be accepted by
another recipient if the message is forwarded. Nonrepudiation
is related to transferability and means that a sender cannot
successfully deny having sent a signed message.
Classical digital signature schemes rely on public-key
encryption. The security of such protocols is based on
the assumed computational difficulty of inverting certain
cryptographic functions. For example, an algorithm that is
widely used for generating digital signatures is the Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [1] cryptosystem, which relies on the
difficulty of factoring the product of two large prime numbers.
However, if a quantum computer is built, this may threaten
the security of such protocols. This is a main motivation for
developing unconditionally secure signature schemes [2,3],
including quantum digital signature (QDS) schemes [4–8]. The
latter are essentially quantum versions of Lamport’s one-time
signature scheme [9], and can offer information-theoretic
security relying on the fundamental laws of quantum physics.
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Previous QDS schemes [5–8] improved on the seminal
work in [4] by removing the need for quantum memory.
Wallden et al. [10] proposed more practical QDS schemes
which could be realized using QKD [11] components. In these
QDS schemes, Alice encodes her signatures in quantum states,
and sends a copy of each state to both Bob and Charlie.
Bob and Charlie are only able to gain partial information
on the overall signature state, due to its quantum nature.
Until recently, the security analysis of all QDS schemes
assumed authenticated quantum channels. In [12,13], all
trust assumptions on the quantum channels are removed,
which is a significant improvement compared to the previous
schemes.
It is however more challenging to guarantee the security
of practical implementations of QDS schemes. This is so
because practical realizations do not typically conform to
the requirements imposed by the theory, as real devices can
behave differently from the models considered in the security
proofs. As a result, we have that any imperfection which is
not accounted for might constitute a “side channel” which
could be used by an adversary to render the QDS scheme
insecure. Here, the most critical devices are arguably the
single-photon detectors [14–21]. For example, an adversary
can use detector loopholes to learn about a participant’s (say
Bob’s) measurement results, and could then forge a message
with Bob. In the context of QKD, detector side channels
can be successfully removed by means of measurement-
device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [22]. In this approach,
Alice and Bob do not perform any measurement but only
send quantum signals to be measured. Thus the advantage
of MDI-QKD is that the legitimate parties need not hold a
measurement device and may treat the measurement apparatus
as a “black box,” which may be fully controlled by Eve. This
is important as it eliminates the requirement to certify the
detectors in a QKD standarization process. Therefore, the bit
strings generated by Alice and Bob are free from detector
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side-channel attacks as they do not employ any detector.
Hence this only requires Alice and Bob to characterize the
quantum states which they send through the channel. This
characterization should take place in a protected environment
outside the influence of the adversary, which in principle is
feasible. Since the invention of MDI-QKD, such schemes
have been very actively studied both theoretically [23–26] and
experimentally [27–32].
In this paper, we present a QDS protocol which eliminates
all detector side-channel attacks by employing the concept
of measurement device independence. This is desirable for
actual practical use of QDS schemes. The main contribution
of this work is to adapt the rigorous security proof of MDI-
QKD given in [26], taking into account finite-size effects, to
the QDS protocol proposed in [12]. The resulting security
proof is valid against general forging and repudiation attacks.
Long-distance implementation of MDI-QKD [27–32] has been
recently achieved, and the experimental parameters allowing
for MDI-QKD could equally well allow for implementa-
tion of our QDS protocol. Hence we envisage not just a
long-distance implementation of a QDS protocol, but an
implementation that is secure against detector side-channel
attacks.
II. PROTOCOL
We outline our protocol for three parties, with a sender,
Alice, and two recipients Bob and Charlie. The setup for
MDI-QDS is illustrated in Fig. 1. We assume that between
Alice and Bob, and between Alice and Charlie, there exist
authenticated classical channels. There is no need for “direct”
quantum channels between Alice and Bob, between Alice
and Charlie, nor between Bob and Charlie. Each party has
an untrusted and imperfect quantum channel with the relay
(Eve). Bob and Charlie share a MDI-QKD link, which can
be used to transmit classical messages in full secrecy. This is
separately indicated in the figure, but could also be realized
with Eve as relay. Any classical secret communication channel
between Bob and Charlie would in fact suffice in place of this
MDI-QKD link. We will describe the procedure for signing a
one-bit message. For signing longer messages, the procedure
can be suitably iterated, meaning that the signature length
scales linearly with message length.
Alice, Bob, and Charlie each use a laser source to
generate quantum signals that are diagonal in the Fock basis.
Sources producing such signals include attenuated laser diodes
emitting phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (WCPs),
triggered spontaneous parametric down-conversion sources,
and practical single-photon sources. The scheme makes use of
a measurement-device-independent key generating protocol
(MDI-KGP), performed in pairs separately by Alice-Bob and
Alice-Charlie; see Sec. III for more details. The purpose
of such an MDI-KGP scheme is to use the noisy untrusted
quantum channels to generate two correlated bit strings, one
for each participant in an MDI-KGP. The noise level is defined
in terms of the relative Hamming distance between these
strings. When the noise level is below a tolerated value, the
relative Hamming distance between the respective strings of
the participants is smaller than the relative Hamming distance
Decoy-IM
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Laser
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FIG. 1. Schematic diagram of a setup for MDI-QDS. Alice, Bob,
and Charlie prepare quantum signals in different BB84 polarization
states, using a polarization modulator (Pol-Mod). In addition, they
generate decoy states with an intensity modulator (Decoy-IM). The
signals are then sent to an untrusted party Eve, who acts like a
relay and is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement, which
projects the incoming signals into a Bell state. The channels between
Alice-Eve, Bob-Eve, and Charlie-Eve are quantum channels (QC).
Eve performs the measurement separately for the pairs Alice-Bob
and Alice-Charlie. Bob and Charlie share a MDI-QKD link (gray
channel), which can be used to transmit classical messages in
full secrecy. The pairs Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie have pairwise
authenticated classical channels (CC) indicated as dashed lines,
through which they can communicate their basis settings for the
different key positions.
between any string that an eavesdropper could produce, and
the participant’s string.
The QDS scheme above is related to the one proposed in
[12], with a difference in the KGP. It comprises of two stages,
a distribution stage, where all quantum communication takes
place, and a messaging stage, which can occur much later, and
where only classical communication is used.
A. Distribution stage
(1) For each possible future message m = 0 or 1, Alice uses
the MDI-KGP to generate four different correlated bit strings,
AB0 ,A
B
1 ,A
C
0 ,A
C
1 , each one of length L. The superscript denotes
the participant with whom Alice performed the MDI-KGP,
and the subscript represents the future message, which is to be
decided later by her. Bob holds the strings KB0 ,KB1 and Charlie
holds the strings KC0 ,KC1 . Because of the KGP, it will be
guaranteed that AB0 contains fewer mismatches with KB0 than
does any string produced by an eavesdropper, and similarly
for the other pairs of strings. Alice’s signature for the future
message m will be Sigm = (ABm,ACm). The fact that only Alice
knows all signatures for a message m protects the protocol
against forging.
(2) For each future message, Bob and Charlie symmetrize
their keys. This is done by each of them choosing at random
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half of the bit values in their keys (KBm,KCm ) and sending
these bit values (as well as the corresponding positions) to
the other participant using their secret classical channel. This
will ensure that Alice cannot make Bob and Charlie disagree
on the validity of a signature, if a message is forwarded from
Bob to Charlie or vice versa in the messaging stage. If Bob
(or Charlie) chooses to forward an element of KBm (or KCm ) in
the distribution stage to Charlie (or Bob), he will not, if he
is honest, further use it to check the validity of a signature.
Bob and Charlie will only use the bits they did not forward,
and those received from the other participant. This is not
strictly necessary, but simplifies the analysis of repudiation
by a dishonest Alice in that from Alice’s point of view, the
probabilities are equal for Bob and Charlie to check a particular
key bit. We denote their symmetrized keys by SBm and SCm ,
with the superscript indicating whether the key is held by Bob
or Charlie. Bob (and Charlie) keep a record of whether an
element in SBm (SCm) came directly from Alice or whether it was
forwarded to him by Charlie (or Bob).
Each of the symmetrized strings held by Bob and Charlie
now contains half of KBm and half of KCm . For each future
possible message m, Bob and Charlie each have a bit string
of length L. Alice has no information on whether it is Bob’s
SBm or Charlie’s SCm that contains a particular element of the
string (KBm,KCm ), which is of length 2L. This protects against
repudiation. Bob has access to all of KBm and half of KCm . He
does not know the other half of KCm which Charlie chose to
keep. This protects the protocol against forging by Bob (and
similarly against forging by Charlie).
B. Messaging stage
(1) To send a signed one-bit message m, Alice sends
(m,Sigm) to the desired recipient (say Bob).
(2) Bob checks whether (m,Sigm) matches his SBm , and
records the number of mismatches he finds. He separately
checks the part of his key received directly from Alice and the
part of the key received from Charlie. If there are fewer than
sa(L/2) mismatches in both halves of the key, where sa < 1/2
is a small threshold determined by the observed experimental
parameters (see Appendix D for more details) and the desired
security level of the protocol, then Bob accepts the message.
(3) To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards the
pair (m,Sigm) that he received from Alice.
(4) Charlie tests for mismatches in a similar way, but using
a different threshold in order to protect against repudiation
by Alice. He accepts the forwarded message if the number of
mismatches in both halves of his key is below sv(L/2), where
sv is another threshold, with 0 < sa < sv < 1/2. An important
and necessary feature of unconditionally secure signature
schemes [2,33] is that the recipients have to use different
thresholds or acceptance criteria for messages received directly
from the sender and for forwarded messages.
III. MEASUREMENT-DEVICE-INDEPENDENT KEY
GENERATION PROTOCOL
MDI-QKD protocols [22,26,34] are schemes that remove
all detector side-channel attacks. This is very important when
we consider detector loopholes in conventional QKD imple-
mentations [14,21]. Similarly, the key generation protocol,
which is part of the QDS scheme we are describing, can
be made measurement device independent. Essentially, Alice
and Bob (or Alice and Charlie) only perform the quantum
part of the MDI-QKD scheme to generate raw different
keys (the ABm and KBm described above) with imperfectly
correlated and not completely secret bit strings. That is,
Alice and Bob do not perform error correction and privacy
amplification. This is sufficient for quantum signatures, since
it is the number of mismatches with the recipient’s key
that matters for the signature protocol; perfectly correlated,
perfectly secret strings are not necessary. The aim is to
show that (ABm,KBm ) < (Eguess,KBm ) except with negligible
probability, where (x,y) is the Hamming distance between
x and y, and Eguess is Eve’s attempt at guessing KBm . It can
also be possible that the adversary Eve is Charlie (for the KGP
performed between Alice and Bob, and for the KGP performed
by Alice and Charlie, Eve could be Bob). The security of the
signature protocol is proved in Sec. IV.
The underlying MDI-QKD protocol, upon which the KGP
is built, is the decoy-state BB84 protocol using phase-
randomized WCPs considered in [22]. We follow the steps of
the protocol in [26], using the Z basis for key generation, but
do not proceed with error correction and privacy amplification.
The different steps of the MDI-KGP are as follows.
(1) State preparation. Alice and Bob repeat the first two
steps of the protocol for i = 1, . . . ,N until the conditions in
the sifting stage are met. For each i, Alice chooses an intensity
a ∈ {as,ad1 ,ad2}, a basis α ∈ {Z,X}, and a random bit r ∈
{0,1} with probability pa,α/2. Here as (adj where j ∈ {1,2}) is
the intensity of the signal (decoy) states. Next, she generates a
quantum signal (e.g., a phase-randomized WCP) of intensity
a prepared in the basis state of α given by r . Similarly, Bob
does the same. Alice and Bob then send their states to Eve via
the quantum channel.
(2) Measurement. If Eve is honest, she makes a Bell state
measurement of the signals she has received. Whether Eve is
honest or not, she informs Alice and Bob through a public
channel of whether or not her measurement was successful. If
successful, she declares the Bell state that is obtained.
(3) Sifting. If Eve reports a successful result, Alice and Bob
communicate through an authenticated channel their intensity
and basis settings. For each Bell state k, we define two groups
of sets: Za,bk and X
a,b
k . Z
a,b
k is a set that identifies signals where
Eve declares a Bell state k and Alice and Bob have selected
the intensities a and b and the basis Z. Similarly, Xa,bk is a
set that identifies signals where Eve declares a Bell state k
and Alice and Bob have selected the intensities a and b and
the basis X. The protocol is repeated until |Za,bk |  Na,bk and
|Xa,bk |  Ma,bk ∀a,b,k [35]. After this, Bob flips part of his bits
to correctly correlate them with those of Alice. This is shown
in Table I.
(4) Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob use nk random
bits from Zas,bsk to form the code bit strings Zk and Z ′k ,
respectively. The remaining Rk bits from Zas,bsk are used to
compute the error rate Eas,bsk = 1Rk
∑
l rl ⊕ rl′ , where rl and
rl′ are Alice’s and Bob’s bits, respectively. The bit string of
length Rk is used to estimate the correlation between Alice
and Bob’s strings generated from the Z basis, after which they
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TABLE I. Processing of data in the sifting stage. The
Bell states are defined as |ψ−〉 = 1√2 (|HV 〉 − |VH 〉), |ψ+〉 =
1√
2 (|HV 〉 + |VH 〉), |φ+〉 = 1√2 (|HH 〉 + |VV 〉), and |φ−〉 =
1√
2 (|HH 〉 − |VV 〉).
Bell state reported by Eve
Alice’s and Bob’s basis |ψ−〉 |ψ+〉 |φ−〉 |φ+〉
Z basis Bit flip Bit flip
X basis Bit flip Bit flip
are discarded. If Eas,bsk > Etol∀k, then Alice and Bob abort the
protocol. If Eas,bsk  Etol, Alice and Bob use Z
a,b
k and X
a,b
k
to estimate nk,0,nk,1 and ek,1. The parameter nk,0 is a lower
bound for the number of bits in Z ′k,keep where Bob sent a
vacuum state. Z ′k,keep is the part of Z ′k which he chooses to
keep with himself while he forwards the other remaining part,
Z ′k,forward, to Charlie during the key symmetrization process.
That is, |Z ′k,keep| = |Z ′k,forward| = nk/2. In a similar way, nk,1
is a lower bound for the number of bits in Z ′k,keep where Alice
and Bob sent a single-photon state. ek,1 is an upper bound for
the single-photon phase error rate. If ek,1  etol, the code bit
strings Zk and Z ′k are discarded, and the protocol is aborted
only if ek,1  etol ∀k.
We will assume that Eve implements her Bell state
measurement using linear optics. The measurement setup is
illustrated in Fig. 2; it is able to identify two of the four Bell
states. Alice and Bob choose Zk and Z ′k as their respective
secret keys ABm and KBm of length L (where L = nk), for which
they obtained the smallest phase error rate ek,1. Here, we will
consider a finite number of states that are sent and measured,
where Eve is allowed to perform general coherent attacks.
Eve
BS
PBS PBS
D1H D1V D2V D2H
Alice Bob/Charlie
FIG. 2. Schematic diagram of Eve’s measurement device. The
combination of polarizing beam splitters (PBSs) and a 50:50 beam
splitter (BS) projects the incoming signals from Alice and Bob or
Charlie into horizontal (H) and vertical (V) polarization states. A
joint click on the single-photon detectors D1H and D2V , or D1V and
D2H , represents a projection into the Bell state |ψ−〉, while a joint
click in D1H and D1V , or D2V and D2H , indicates a projection into
the Bell state |ψ+〉.
Our strategy is to find Eve’s information in terms of
the smooth min-entropy [36], and then use it to bound the
probability that she can make a signature declaration making
fewer errors than a certain value. We begin by finding Eve’s
smooth min-entropy on Bob’s bit string Z ′k,keep, by following
the same strategy as in [12]. In spite of the fact that the KGP
is built on MDI-QKD, the security analysis for the MDI-KGP
does not follow directly from the security of the MDI-QKD
protocol. One reason is that the goal of an adversary in the
signature protocol is different from that of an eavesdropper
in MDI-QKD. For the signature protocol, what matters is the
number of mismatches with a recipient’s key; for QKD, what
matters is the information an eavesdropper can hold about a
key. These are related but not identical.
Previous work [12] followed [37] to find Eve’s smooth
min-entropy in a similar way as for decoy-state QKD. Another
important difference from QKD is that in the signature
protocol, Bob effectively gives the extra informationZ ′k,forward
to Eve (with respect to forging with Bob, Charlie can be “Eve”).
In a similar way, let us denote the classical random variables
Rk and  as the information gained by Eve from parameter
estimation and basis declarations for all the pulses sent by
Alice and Bob, respectively. Since Bob, if he is honest, does
not useZ ′k,forward, this could be treated as the part of the string
Rk that is sacrificed for parameter estimation, as explained in
[38]. We combine all of Eve’s information into one quantum
system living in the Hilbert space HE . This comprises the
space containing Eve’s ancilla quantum system following her
general attack,HE′ , as well as the spaces containing the states
encoding the strings Rk, and Z ′k,forward. Then, according to
[26], Eve’s smooth min-entropy, which quantifies the average
probability that she guesses Z ′k,keep within a certain threshold
using the optimal strategy with access to Ek , is given by
Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek)ρ  nk,0 + nk,1[1 − h(ek,1)] − 2 log2
2
ε′kεˆk
,
(1)
where εk  ε′k + εˆk andρ is the state shared by Eve and the part
of the key that Bob kept and did not forward. We are interested
in a regime where the first two terms on the right-hand side
(RHS) of Eq. (1) are much larger than the log2 term as ε′k and
εˆk are typically of the order say 10−5–10−10. Therefore, we
arrive at the following approximation of Eq. (1):
Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek)ρ  nk,0 + nk,1[1 − h(ek,1)]. (2)
Appendix A provides a brief analysis of the estimation of
the parameters nk,0, nk,1, and ek,1, and Appendix B briefly
describes the steps involved to obtain Eq. (1).
Note that Eq. (2) is similar to Eq. (1) obtained in [12]. The
next task is to bound the number of errors that Eve is likely
to make when guessing Bob’s key, given the bound on her
smooth min-entropy. For this, we use Proposition 1 in [12]
and follow the same argumentation.
Proposition 1. [12]. If Bob and Eve share the state ρ then,
for any eavesdropping strategy, Eve’s average probability of
making at most r mistakes when guessingZ ′k,keep can be upper
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bounded as
〈pr〉 
r∑
m=0
( nk
2
m
)
2−H
εk
min(Z ′k,keep|Ek)ρ + εk. (3)
The proof of this proposition follows the lines introduced
in Appendix B of [12]. For large nk , it can be shown from
Markov’s inequality that Eq. (3) implies
P (Eve makes fewer than r errors) := pr  g, (4)
except with probability at most
pF := 1
g
(
2−
nk
2 {ck,0+ck,1[1−h(ek,1)]−h(2r/nk )} + εk
)
, (5)
where ck,i := 2nk,i/nk is the lower bound on the count rate for
the Z basis pulses containing i photons. Therefore, we arrive
at the condition that determines whether or not Eve is able
to make fewer than r errors with non-negligible probability,
given as
ck,0 + ck,1[1 − h(ek,1)] − h(2r/nk) > 0. (6)
If the condition holds, then nk can be increased to make Eve’s
probability of making fewer than r errors arbitrarily small. We
define pE by the equation
ck,0 + ck,1[1 − h(ek,1)] − h(pE) = 0. (7)
The meaning of this is that pE is the minimum rate at which
Eve can make errors for the code string associated with the
Bell state k (except with negligible probability pF ). Suppose
the error rate on the Z basis measurements between Alice and
Bob is upper bounded as Ek . As long as pE > Ek , there exists
a choice of parameters and a sufficiently large signature length
which makes the protocol secure. This means that MDI-QDS
is possible as long as
ck,0 + ck,1[1 − h(ek,1)] − h(Ek) > 0. (8)
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We will now prove the security of the signature protocol,
i.e., the robustness (probability of an honest run aborting),
security against forging (probability that a recipient generates
a signature, not originating from Alice, that is accepted as
authentic), and repudiation (or transferability) (probability that
Alice generates a signature that is accepted by Bob but then,
when forwarded, is rejected by Charlie). In what follows we
assume that Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie have each used the
MDI-KGP to generate bit strings of length L = nk , to use in
the QDS protocol described above.
(a) Robustness. Bob rejects a signed message if the nk2 bits
received from either Alice or Charlie have a mismatch rate
higher than sa with Alice’s signature. We note that Alice and
Bob use a random sample, Rk bits from Zas,bsk , to obtain the
error rate Eas,bsk . This implies that the error rate E
as,bs
k between
the strings (Zk,keep and Z ′k,keep) generated using the Z basis
satisfies the inequality [39]
E
as,bs
k  E
as,bs
k + μ
(
nk
2
,Rk,εPE
)
, (9)
where
μ
(
nk
2
,Rk,εPE
)
=
√(
nk
2 − Rk + 1
)
ln
( 1
εPE
)
Rknk
. (10)
This means that the upper bound which we obtain from Eq. (9)
on the error rate between Alice’s and Bob’s strings is true
except with a very small probability εPE , and this probability
can be fixed as small as desired. For any fixed value of the
function μ, the failure probability decays exponentially fast in
the parameter Rk . Then we set Ek := max{Ek,B,Ek,C}, where
Ek,B and Ek,C refer to the upper bound obtained in Eq. (9) for
the cases Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie, and we choose sa such
that sa > Ek . We have that the probability that Bob will find
an error rate higher than sa is bounded by
P (honest abort)  2εPE, (11)
where the factor of 2 accounts for the fact that the abort can
be due to either the states received from Alice or the states
received from Charlie.
(b) Security against repudiation. Successful repudiation by
Alice means, in the three-party scenario, that she makes Bob
accept a declaration (m,Sigm) that was sent to him by her,
while Charlie rejects the same declaration when Bob forwards
it to him (or similarly for a message forwarded from Charlie to
Bob). Intuitively, security against repudiation follows because
of the symmetrization performed by Bob and Charlie using the
secret classical channel. Even if Alice knows and can control
the error rates between ABm, ACm and KBm , KCm , she cannot
control whether the errors end up with Bob or Charlie. After
symmetrization the keys SBm and SCm will each have the same
expected number of errors. To repudiate, one key must contain
significantly more errors than the other. Using results from
[12], we obtain
P (repudiation)  2 exp [− 14 (sv − sa)2nk]. (12)
For a formal proof, please see Appendix C. Note that the
probability of repudiation decays exponentially as the length
nk of the signature increases.
(c) Security against forging. It is easier for either Bob
or Charlie to forge than it is for any other external party.
Therefore, we will consider forging by an internal party. In
order to forge a message, Bob must give a declaration (m,Sigm)
to Charlie that has fewer than svnk/2 mismatches with the (to
Bob) unknown half of SCm sent directly from Alice to Charlie,
and also fewer than svnk/2 mismatches with the half he himself
forwarded to Charlie. An adversarial Bob will obviously be
able to meet the threshold on the part he forwarded to Charlie.
We therefore consider only the unknown half that Charlie
received directly from Alice. We have that the maximum rate
at which Alice will make errors with Charlie’s key is given by
Ek . From Eq. (7), we also know the minimum rate at which
Bob will make errors with the code string associated with the
Bell state k of Charlie’s key; we have denoted this by pE .
Assuming (8) holds, we choose sv such that Ek < sv < pE .
In this case, Charlie will likely accept a legitimate signature
sent by Alice, since the upper bound on their error rate, Ek ,
is less than the threshold sv . On the other hand, Charlie will
likely reject any dishonest signature declaration by Bob, since
the probability of Bob finding a signature with an error rate
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smaller than sv is restricted by (4) as
P (Bob makes fewer than svnk/2 errors) := pr  g (13)
except with probability at most pF given by (5). If the
estimation of the parameter Ek fails, which can happen with
probability εPE , we will assume for simplicity that Bob is able
to successfully forge with certainty. In a similar way as in [12],
we are then able to bound Bob’s probability of successfully
forging as
P (forge)  pF + g + εPE + εk,0 + εk,1 + εk,e. (14)
This equation is valid for any choice of parameters
(g,εPE,εk,0,εk,1,εk,e) greater than zero. Thereby, Bob’s prob-
ability to forge can be made arbitrarily small by increasing nk .
The addition of εPE accounts for the probability that the upper
bound on Ek is incorrect and εk,0,εk,1 and εk,e are the error
probabilities associated with the estimation of nk,0, nk,1, and
ek,1, respectively (see Appendix A).
V. COMPARISON TO MDI-QKD
According to [26], in MDI-QKD the length lk of the secret
bit string associated to the Bell state k is given by
lk  nk,0 + nk,1[1 − h(ek,1)] − leakEC,k − log2
8
	cor
−2 log2
2
ε′kεˆk
− 2 log2
1
2εk,PA
, (15)
if the protocol is 	sec secret, with 	sec =
∑
k 	k,sec and 	k,sec =
2(ε′k + 2εk,e + εˆk) + εk,b + εk,0 + εk,1 + εk,PA. Here εk,PA is
the failure probability of privacy amplification, and the term
leakEC,k is the information that is revealed by Alice in the error
correction step. The meaning of the remaining epsilons can be
found in [26]. The correctness of the protocol is guaranteed
by the error correction step, and we say that the protocol is
	cor correct if the probability that Alice’s and Bob’s bit strings
are not identical is not greater than 	cor. In the asymptotic
limit of very large data blocks, one can neglect certain terms
that reduce the secret key length and thereby Eq. (15) can be
rewritten as
lk ≈ nk{ck,0 + ck,1[1 − h(ek,1)]} − leakEC,k. (16)
Here, ck,i := nk,i/nk increase the secret key rate, while
nkck,1h(ek,1) and leakEC,k reduce it. These parameters depend
on the sifted key length nk [26]. leakEC,k = nkζh(Eas,bsk ),
where ζ is referred to as the leakage parameter, which depends
on the value ofnk , andh(.) denotes the binary Shannon entropy.
ζ is assumed to be 1.16 in [26] but can generally be in the range
1.1–1.2, and when nk < 105 the parameter ζ may be greater
than 1.16. Therefore, for a sifted key length nk2 , Eq. (16) can
be written as
lk ≈ nk2 {ck,0 + ck,1[1 − h(ek,1)] − ζh(Ek)}. (17)
In a similar way as in [12], when we compare Eqs. (8) and (17),
we find that there are Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie quantum
channels for which quantum signatures are possible and yet
practical MDI-QKD is not, since the error threshold is less
strict for the quantum channels used to perform the KGP in
the signature protocol.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we analyze the number of quantum trans-
missions necessary to sign a message with a security level of
the order of 10−5 and 10−10, respectively. If the security level
of the protocol is of the order of, say, 10−5, then this means
that the probabilities of honest abort, forging, and repudiation
are all less than 10−5.
Using realistic experimental quantities, we estimate that a
signature length of nk = 8.9 × 106 (for each of the possible
single bit messages zero and 1) can be used to securely sign a
single bit message, sent over a distance of 50 km. Essentially,
it would require Bob or Charlie to transmit approximately
Nsig = 5.58 × 1012 quantum states (per bit to be signed) to
Alice during their KGPs (for full details, see Appendix D).
With a source with a pulse rate of 1 GHz, we can calculate
that it would take approximately 93 min to generate a raw key
when the experiment uses standard single-photon detectors
with detection efficiency (ηD) of 14.5%. This is for a security
level of the order of 10−5. By using detectors with higher
detection efficiency we can improve the time of generating a
raw key (tr ) since sending a smaller number of signals (Nsig)
is then required to sign a single-bit message.
Table II shows the raw key generation times for various
detectors that could be used in the protocol. We find that
the most advanced superconducting nanowire single-photon
detectors (SNSPDs) having 93% efficiency [42] would only
require Bob or Charlie to send 6.4 × 1010 signals to perform
the protocol with a secure threshold of the order of 10−5. This
would require just above a minute to generate the raw key. In
order to improve the security threshold of the protocol (say
10−10), Bob or Charlie would need to send a higher number
of signals compared to the previous case. Table III shows the
raw key generation times and the number of signals that are
TABLE II. Raw key generation times for various detectors that could be used in a MDI-QDS protocol for a distance of 50 km and a security
threshold of 10−5. The parameters ηD(%), Y0, and Nsig denote respectively the detection efficiency, dark count rate of Eve’s detectors, and the
number of signals that Bob or Charlie sends to Alice during their KGPs. tr is the time taken to generate the raw key and to estimate tr we
assume a source with a pulse rate of 1 GHz.
Detectors ηD (%) Y0 (×10−6) Nsig (×1012) tr (min)
Standard single-photon detectors [40] 14.5 6.02 5.58 93
InGaAs avalanche photodiodes detectors (APD) [32] 30 130 1.8 30
InGaAs/InP APD [41] 55 500 0.87 14.5
Superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) [42] 93 1 0.098 1.6
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TABLE III. Raw key generation times for a distance of 50 km
with a security threshold of 10−10. For the definition of the different
parameters, see the caption of Table II.
Detectors Nsig (×1012) tr (min)
Standard single-photon detectors [40] 10.5 175
InGaAs APD [32] 3.35 55.83
InGaAs/InP APD [41] 1.63 27.1
SNSPDs [42] 0.18 3
required to send for the protocol to be secure for a threshold
of the order of 10−10.
The protocol is secure to the order of 10−10 for a distance
of 50 km, which in comparison is an improvement over the
previous scheme [12] having a security threshold of 10−4. The
simulation results demonstrate that even with practical signals
(for example, phase-randomized WCPs) and a finite size of
data (say 1011 to 1014 signals) it is possible to perform secure
MDI-QDS (with security threshold 10−10) over long distances
(up to about 150 km). Since the experimental platform for the
implementation of MDI-QKD can also be used for MDI-QDS
with slight modifications, in particular in the postprocessing
of measurement results, we expect MDI-QDS could be widely
used in practical QDS systems in the near future.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have presented a MDI-QDS protocol
and proven it unconditionally secure against general attacks.
It improves on previous quantum signature protocols by
removing all detector side-channel attacks. This is essentially
achieved by adapting the rigorous security proof of MDI-QKD
given in [26], taking into account finite-size effects, to the
QDS protocol proposed in [12] and we have presented that the
resulting security proof is valid against general forging and
repudiation attacks.
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APPENDIX A: ESTIMATION OF RELEVANT
PARAMETERS
In this Appendix we briefly discuss the estimation of
the parameter nk,0. This is a two-step process. First, we
calculate a lower bound for the number of indices in Zas,bsk
where Bob sent a vacuum state. This lower bound is denoted
mk,0. Second, we compute nk,0 from mk,0 using the Serfling
inequality for random sampling without replacement [39]. The
other parameters, nk,1 and ek,1, are also estimated using a
similar approach. A detailed explanation is provided in the
supplementary notes of [26].
We assume that Alice and Bob use two decoy states each and
the photon-number distribution of their signals is Poissonian.
That is, a ∈ A = {as,ad1 ,ad2}, with as > ad1 > ad2 , b ∈ B =
{bs,bd1 ,bd2}, with bs > bd1 > bd2 , and the probability that
Alice (Bob) sends an n-photon (m-photon) signal when she
(he) selects the intensity a (b) is given by pn|a = e−aan/n!
(pm|b = e−bbm/m!).
Let Sk,nm denote the number of signals sent by Alice and
Bob with n and m photons, respectively, when they select
the basis Z and Eve declares the Bell state k. Now, for each
combination of values n and m, the signal and decoy states
provide a random sample of the population of all signals
containing n and m photons, respectively. Therefore, one
can apply the standard large deviation theory technique, in
particular a multiplicative form of the Chernoff bound [26].
Then, if (
2ε−1a,b
)1/μa,bk,L  exp[3/(4√2)]2],
and (
εˆ−1a,b
)1/μa,bk,L  exp (1/3),
with the parameter μa,bk,L given by
μ
a,b
k,L =
∣∣Za,bk ∣∣−
√∑
a,b
|Za,bk |/2 ln(1/	a,b), (A1)
this implies that∣∣Za,bk ∣∣ = ∑
n,m
pa,b|nm,ZSk,nm + δa,b, (A2)
except with error probability γa,b = 	a,b + εa,b + εˆa,b. Here,
pa,b|nm,Z refers to the conditional probability that Alice and
Bob have selected the intensity settings a and b, respectively,
given that their signals contain n and m photons, respectively,
prepared in the Z basis. The parameter δa,b ∈ [−a,b, ˆa,b]
with a,b = g(|Za,bk |,ε4a,b/16) and ˆa,b = g(|Za,bk |,εˆ3/2a,b ), and
the function g(x,y) =
√
2x ln(y−1).
By using similar arguments, the quantity mk,0 can be
written as
mk,0 =
∑
n
pas,bs |n0,ZSk,n0 − 0, (A3)
except with error probability ε0, where 0 =
g(∑n pas,bs |n0,ZSk,n0,ε0). To obtain a lower bound for
mk,0, one can minimize Eq. (A3) given the linear constraints
imposed by Eq. (A2) ∀a,b. This is solved both analytically
and numerically in the supplementary notes of [26]. Then
using Serfling inequality [39], we find
nk,0 = max
{⌊
nk
2
mk,0∣∣Zas,bsk ∣∣ −
nk
2

(∣∣Zas,bsk ∣∣,nk2 ,ε′′k,0
)⌋
,0
}
,
(A4)
except with error probability
εk,0  ε′k,0 + ε′′k,0, (A5)
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where ε′k,0  ε0 +
∑
a,b γa,b corresponds to the total error
probability in the estimation of mk,0 and the function (x,y,z)
is defined as (x,y,z) =
√
(x − y + 1) ln(z−1)/(2xy).
A similar approach is followed to estimate nk,1 and ek,1
with associated error probabilities εk,1 and εk,e, respectively.
We obtain
nk,1 = max
{⌊
nk
2
mk,1∣∣Zas,bsk ∣∣ −
nk
2

(∣∣Zas,bsk ∣∣,nk2 ,ε′′k,1
)⌋
,0
}
,
(A6)
except with error probability
εk,1  ε′k,1 + ε′′k,1, (A7)
where ε′k,1  ε1 +
∑
a,b γa,b. Here, mk,1 = pas,bs |11,ZSk,11 −
1, except with error probability ε1 where the parameter 1 =
g(pas,bs |11,ZSk,11,ε1). Finally, the parameter ek,1 is given as
ek,1 = min
{⌈
nk,1
(
ek,1
nk,1
)
+ (nk,1 + nk,1)
× ϒ(nk,1,nk,1,ε′′′k,e)
⌉
,nk,1
}
, (A8)
except with error probability
εk,e  ε′k,e + ε′′k,e + ε′′′k,e, (A9)
where the function ϒ(x,y,z) is defined as ϒ(x,y,z) =√
(x + 1) ln(z−1)/[2y(x + y)]. The quantity nk,1 is a lower
bound for the number of signals where Alice and Bob send
a single-photon state prepared in the X basis and where Eve
declares the Bell state k, ek,1 is an upper bound for the total
number of errors in these signals, and ε′k,e and ε′′k,e represent,
respectively, their associated error probabilities. For more
details about how to calculate these parameters, please see [26].
We have, therefore, that the error probability associated
with the estimation of the different parameters is given by
εPE + εk,0 + εk,1 + εk,e, with εPE given by Eq. (9).
APPENDIX B: EVE’S SMOOTH-MIN ENTROPY
The goal of this Appendix is to derive Eq. (B2). The
analysis follows the procedure introduced in [26]. For this,
let Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek) denote the smooth min-entropy which
quantifies the average probability that the adversary guesses
Z ′k,keep correctly using the optimal strategy with access to
Ek . Now the bits of Z ′k,keep can be distributed among three
different strings, Z ′0k,keep, Z
′1
k,keep, and Z
′rest
k,keep. The first string
contains bits where Bob sent a vacuum state, the second where
Alice and Bob sent a single-photon state, and Z ′restk,keep contains
the rest of the bits. Using the result of chain rule of entropies
[43], we obtain
Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek)
 H	
′
k+2	′′k +(	ˆk+2	ˆ′k+	ˆ′′k )
min
(Z ′0k,keepZ ′1k,keepZ ′restk,keep∣∣Ek)
 nk,0 + H	
′′
k
min
(Z ′1k,keep∣∣Z ′0k,keepZ ′restk,keepEk)− 2 log2 2	′k	ˆk ,
(B1)
where εk = 	′k + 2	′′k + (	ˆk + 2	ˆ′k + 	ˆ′′k ). Here, it is taken
into consideration that H	ˆ
′
k
min(Z ′restk,keep|Z
′0
k,keepEk)  0, and
H
	ˆ′′k
min(Z ′0k,keep|Ek)  H 0min(Z
′0
k,keep|Ek) = Hmin(Z
′0
k,keep) = nk,0.
The final part arises as the vacuum states contain no
information about their bit values, which are uniformly
distributed. In order to get the lower bound for the term
H
	′′k
min(Z ′1k,keep|Z
′0
k,keepZ
′rest
k,keepEk), it is considered that Alice and
Bob prepare perfect BB84 states. Then, this quantity can be
written in terms of the smooth max-entropy between them,
which is directly bounded by the strength of the correlations
[44]. From the entropy uncertainty relation [36], we obtain
H
	′′k
min
(Z ′1k,keep∣∣Z ′0k,keepZ ′restk,keepEk)  nk,1 − H	′′kmax(X 1k ∣∣X ′1k )
 nk,1 − nk,1h(ek,1).
Using the above equation in Eq. (B1), we get
Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek)  nk,0 + nk,1[1 − h(ek,1)] − 2 log2
2
	′k	ˆk
.
(B2)
We are interested in a regime where the first two terms on the
RHS of Eq. (B2) are much larger than the log2 term, as ε′k and
εˆk are typically of the order say 10−5–10−10. Therefore, if we
neglect this log2 term, we obtain Eq. (2) of the main paper,
Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek)  nk,0 + nk,1[1 − h(ek,1)]. (B3)
APPENDIX C: SECURITY AGAINST REPUDIATION
We follow the approach in [10]. If Alice tries to repudiate
a message, she sends a declaration (m,Sigm) which Bob will
accept and Charlie will reject. For this to happen, Bob must
accept both the elements that Alice sent directly to him, and the
elements that Charlie forwarded to him. In order for Charlie to
reject he needs only to reject either the elements he received
from Alice, or the elements Bob forwarded to him (or both).
Intuitively, security against repudiation follows because of the
symmetrization performed by Bob and Charlie using the secret
classical channel. In the distribution stage, to send the future
message m, Alice uses the MDI-KGP with Bob and Charlie to
generate strings of length nk = L. Suppose that Bob holds the
string (b1, . . . ,bL) and Charlie holds the string (c1, . . . ,cL).
Now, for simplicity, we consider that Alice has full power
and we assume that later on, in the messaging stage, she is
able to fully control the number of mismatches her signature
declaration contains with (b1, . . . ,bL) and (c1, . . . ,cL). Let us
denote the mismatch rates by eB and eC , respectively. Then,
the symmetrization process means that Bob and Charlie will
randomly (and unknown to Alice) receive L/2 elements of the
other’s string. We aim to show that any choice of eC and eB
leads to an exponentially decaying probability of repudiation.
Then we have the two following cases as in [10].
Case 1. First, let us assume that eC > sa . In this case, Bob
receives L/2 elements from the set {c1, . . . ,cL}, which con-
tains exactly eCL mismatches with Alice’s future declaration.
In order to accept the message, Bob must get fewer than saL/2
errors. Using [45] we can bound the probability that Bob gets
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fewer than saL/2 mismatches as
P (Bob gets less than saL/2 mismatches from Charlie)
 exp[−(eC − sa)2L]. (C1)
To repudiate, Alice must make Bob accept the message, which
means that Bob must accept both the part received from
Alice and the part received from Charlie. Since P (A ∩ B) 
min{P (A),P (B)} the probability of repudiation must be less
than or equal to the above expression, and so must also decrease
exponentially.
Case 2. Suppose eC  sa . In this case, if eB > sa , the above
argument shows that it is highly likely that Bob will reject
the message, so we examine only the case where eB  sa .
Consider first the set {b1, . . . ,bL}. We can use the same
arguments as above to bound the probability of selecting more
than svL/2 mismatches as
P (Charlie gets more than svL/2 mismatches from Bob)
 exp[−(sv − eB)2L]. (C2)
Then, Alice succeeds if Charlie finds more than svL/2 mis-
matches either from the set {b1, . . . ,bL} or the set {c1, . . . ,cL}.
Using P (A ∪ B)  P (A) + P (B), we can see that, for the
choice of eB,eC  sa , we have
P (Charlie gets more than svL/2 mismatches)
 2 exp[−(sv − sa)2L]. (C3)
So again, the probability of Alice successfully repudiating
decreases exponentially in the size of the signature, and Alice’s
best strategy would be to pick eB = eC = 12 (sv + sa), in which
case
P (repudiation)  2 exp [− 14 (sv − sa)2L]. (C4)
APPENDIX D: CALCULATION OF THE NUMBER
OF QUANTUM TRANSMISSIONS REQUIRED
PER SIGNED BIT
1. Parameters and constraints
Similar to [12], the correctness and security of the protocol
depends on the three equations (11), (12), and (14), which
in turn depend on the choice of parameters sa and sv . The
parameters are considered such that Ek < sa < sv < pE . We
say that Ek is the maximum of the worst-case error rates
that Alice makes with Bob’s key (found from the Alice-Bob
MDI-KGP), and the worst-case error rates Alice makes with
Charlie’s key (found from the Alice-Charlie MDI-KGP).
Similarly, pE is the minimum of the adversary’s error rates
found from the Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie MDI-KGP. We
follow [12] to choose the parameters that minimize the number
of quantum transmissions required per signed bit. This will be
larger than the signature length, L, due to factors such as
channel loss, detection efficiency, and parameter estimation
procedures. Because of this, Bob will have to transmit more
than L quantum states to generate a signature of length L.
In the next section, we will calculate the length of the
signature and the number of quantum transmissions necessary
to sign a message with a security level of 10−5. This means
that the probabilities of honest abort, forging, and repudiation,
given respectively by (11), (14), and (12), are all less than
10−5. To find the length per possible one-bit message, of the
signature necessary to securely sign a one-bit message, we
must first choose the parameters sa and sv . That is, a signature
sequence of length L needs to be transmitted for the possible
message “0,” and for the possible message “1,” so that the total
signature sequence has length 2L. Ideally, our choice would
minimize L. We choose to set εPE = 10−5 and
sa = Ek + pE − Ek3 , sv = Ek +
2(pE − Ek)
3
. (D1)
These may not be the optimal choices of these parameters.
However, a natural choice would be to choose the parameters
in order to equally partition the gap between Ek and pE .
2. Number of quantum transmissions required per signed bit
In this section, we use experimental data provided by
[40] to give an optimal estimate of the number of states
Bob needs to transmit over a 50 km quantum channel to
securely sign a one bit message. We set 	PE = 10−5 in all
equations that follow. The experiment in [40] considers a
free-space channel; we assume a fiber-based channel with a
loss coefficient of 0.2 dB/km. Here, we consider standard
single-photon detectors where the detection efficiency of the
relay is 14.5% and the background rate is 6.02 × 10−6. The
overall misalignment in the channel is assumed to be 1% and
the bound is fixed to be εk = 10−10. The other parameters
involved are as follows.
(i) Source: 1 GHz pulse rate.
(ii) Basis probabilities: pZ = 62.5%; pX = 37.5%.
(iii) Intensity levels: (s,d1,d2) = (0.18,0.09,5 × 10−4).
(iv) Intensity probabilities: ps = 50%; pd1 = pd2 = 25%.
We consider the total number of signals sent by Bob to be
5.58 × 1012, and find the raw key to contain 9.42 × 106 bit
values from Z basis measurement outcomes. Assuming that
5.5% of the detected signals are used for error rate estimation
(Rk = 5.18 × 105), we obtain a signature length of nk = 8.9 ×
106. Of these, Bob will randomly choose nk/2 = 4.45 × 106
to be Z ′k,keep; another nk/2 will be used as Z ′k,forward.
For the given intensity levels and intensity choice probabil-
ities, we observe an error rate in the Z basis given by Eas,bsk =
2.07%. This error rate arises from the channel misalignment
together with the dark-count rate of the detectors. We can
then use Eq. (9) to upper bound the true error rate as
E
as,bs
k = 2.39%.
We use Appendix A to estimate the relevant parameters
by setting all ε as 10−10, and thereby we can calculate the
min-entropy. Finally, setting εk = 10−10, we get
Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek) = 8.69 × 105. (D2)
Then using (7) we find pE as 3.02%, and so we ob-
tain sa = 2.60% and sv = 2.81%. Setting g as 10−5 and
substituting these values into Eqs. (11), (14), and (12), we
find P (honest abort) = 2.00 × 10−5, P (forge) = 3 × 10−5,
and P (repudiation) = 9.857 × 10−5. Thus we observe that
when 5.58 × 1012 states are transmitted, the protocol is secure
to a level of the order of 10−5 for a distance of 50 km. The
analysis for the other cases shown in Tables II and III is done
in a similar way.
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